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Abstract
We develop a theory of \risky utilities", i.e. private rms that manage an infrastructure
for public service, and that may be tempted to engage in excessively risky activities, such as
reducing maintenance expenditures (at the risk of provoking a break-down of the system) or
in speculation (at the risk of incurring massive losses it cannot bear). These risky utilities
include nancial utilities like exchanges, clearinghouses or payment systems, as well as standard
utilities like electricity transmission networks. Continuation of service is essential, so risky
utilities cannot be liquidated. The optimal regulatory contract minimizes the social cost among
the contracts that steer the rm away from risky activities. It is simple and implemented with
a capital (equity) adequacy requirement and a resolution mechanism when that requirement is
breached. The social cost function is explicitly computed and comparative statics can be simply
derived.
Keywords: JEL Classication: D82, D86, G28, L43.
1 Introduction
Utilities are private rms that maintain infrastructure for a public service. Classical examples are
distribution networks for electricity, natural gas or water, or generators. Utilities are traditionally
considered as \safe" and thus in several dimensions. First they are often monitored by public
authorities, who are supposed to ensure that the physical infrastructure is well maintained. Second,
utilities often benet from the implicit guarantee of the government should they encounter nancial
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diculties. Third, they are typically regarded as a safe investment. For example the US electricity
company Con-Edison is renowned for steadily increasing its dividend over the last 40 years.1
Several scandals have altered this perception. The California rolling blackouts of 2000-2001
showed that utilities can fail in spectacular ways; this crisis is said to have cost $40 to $45 billion.
At the same time Enron's downfall exposed speculative activities at the source of both its failure
and the California crisis. These events are not unique: the 2003 Northeast US blackout aected an
estimated 10 million people in Ontario and 45 million in eight U.S. states. Its origin is attributed
to a lack of pruning of trees, which interfered with the transmission lines. In 2011, a power line fell
to the ground in Kilmore East (Victoria, Australia) and started a re that killed 119 people. The
ensuing settlement amounted to AUD 500 million, of which 400 million had to be paid by the State
of Victoria because the liability of the private operator had been capped. The transmission line fell
because of a faulty conductor that was lacking a protective cap costing $10. Simultaneously, the
Horsham (Victoria) re started also because of a fallen power line, the screws of which had become
loose thanks to inadequate maintenance. The class action was settled for AUD 40 million.
Moreover the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2007-09 has renewed interest in the notion of
\utility banking", i.e. banking activities (such as deposit taking, management of payments and
loans to small businesses) that are viewed as essential to the economy. 2 This notion has lead
to several proposals by Volcker (US), Vickers (UK) and Liikanen (EU) for (i) separating or at
least ring-fencing the \utility" activities of banks from speculative activities such as proprietary
trading and (ii) designate some institutions as systemically signicant and thus subject to enhanced
regulatory scrutiny and possibly to drastic intervention.3
An important consequence of the GFC was the adoption of special regulations for nancial
institutions whose interruption of service would entail important social costs. The Dodd-Frank
1Con Edison investor relations: http://investor.conedison.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=61493&p=irol-dividends.
2Goodhart (2013) even includes investment banking in these utility activities. He writes: \The provision of access
to nancial markets, which is what investment banks do, though primarily for large clients, is as much a utility as the
provision of retail services to smaller customers". In his Guardian article \Taming the nancial casino. We need to
restore narrow banking { to ensure that risky bets cannot again jeopardize the utility", of March 24, 2009, John Kay
claimed: \We attached a casino { proprietary trading activity by banks { to a utility { the payment system, together
with the deposits and lending that are essential to the day-to-day functioning of the non-nancial economy."
3Goodhart (2013) analyzes in detail why this ring-fencing may be dicult to implement. We will not explore this
direction here.
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Act introduced the new notion of \Financial Utility": nancial infrastructures that are vital for
the US economy, such as securities or derivative exchanges, large-value payment systems and clear-
inghouses.4 According to Paul Tucker (Deputy Governor, Bank of England) the consequence of
the failure of such an institution is \mayhem", as he witnessed in 1987.5 The Hong Kong Futures
Exchange clearinghouse failed as a consequence of the stock crash of 1987. It resulted in Hong
Kong's futures market and its stock market closing also for a time; they re-opened 45:5% lower.
Such a fall does not just aect market participants. That failure owed to the pursuit of trading
volumes (generating fee income) at the expense of the creditworthiness of the participants. Tucker
argues \this episode warrants more study than it has received."6 The recent push to centrally clear
derivative adds to that impetus (Tucker, 2014).
This article proposes a theory of the regulation of these \Risky Utilities". Most utilities are
already subject to regulation, but its object is only to curb their market power. A vast academic
literature has studied this form of utility regulation starting with Hotelling (1938), Dupuit (1952)
and expanded since by Baron and Myerson (1982), Sappington (1983) and Laont and Tirole (1986)
(see also Laont and Tirole, 1993). Instead we lay the emphasis on the problem of risk management
and continuation of service that is essential to the economy.
Our model is general enough to address both the maintenance problems of traditional utilities
and the speculation problems of nancial utilities. We label a risky utility any private company
that manages an infrastructure for public service, and that may be tempted to reduce maintenance
expenditures (at the risk of provoking a break-down) or to engage in speculative activities (at the
risk of incurring massive losses it cannot bear). There is already a large literature on the regulation
of To Big To Fail banks and Systemically Important Financial Institutions. We focus on the \pure"
utility problem and capture the notion of a risky utility by three simple features:
 the company can secretely engage in risky activities (lack of maintenance or speculation) that
increase prot but may provoke huge losses (a catastrophe);
4Systemically important nancial market utilities (SIFMU) are entities whose failure or disruption could threaten
the stability of the US nancial system. As of September 2014 eight entities in the U.S. have been designated
SIFMUs. Under the Dodd{Frank Act the Financial Stability Oversight Council can designate a nancial market
utility systemically important.
5Financial Times, 16 April 2012.
6FT.com, 2 June 2011.
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 shut-down would exert large negative externalities, so the rm cannot be liquidated and public
authorities must intervene following the catastrophe;7
 operating prots are stationary so that we abstract from the questions of size and investment
policy. This ts a public exchange, a clearinghouse, an electricity transmission company or a
generator (after construction).
Public authorities have the power to regulate the company ex ante and restructure it ex post, should
a catastrophe occur. The object of the article is to determine the best regulation contract. To this
end we develop a model of risk-taking under moral hazard in continuous time that is tractable
enough to allow for a quasi-explicit solution. Comparative statics are then easy to derive.
A regulated rm (agent) can engage in two types of socially wasteful activities: cash-ow
diversion and risky activities (speculation) that improve short term protability but may trigger
large losses governed by a Poisson process. The rm is protected by limited liability. An incentive-
compatible regulation contract deters both, and the optimal contract minimizes the social cost of
regulation among incentive-compatible contracts. This contract is very simple: it is a termination
rule associated with restructuring, that is, expropriation of the rm's owners (with compensation)
and on sale to new investors. That intervention is triggered when the value of the rm falls below
of a threshold; this is interpreted as, and implemented with, a minimal capital requirement. This
threshold corresponds to the lowest continuation values that deters speculation. Equity here does
not just absorb losses, it also guarantee the rm has enough to lose to not speculate.
We also show there is a connection between cash ow diversion and speculation through the
incentive contract, although these activities are independent. The more ecient is diversion the
more attractive is the instantaneous return on speculation, and so the more dicult it is to deter.
Deterring speculation thus requires a higher equity threshold; so more ecient cash ow diversion
induces a higher social cost (because of the option to speculate).
Our paper is related to four strands of the literature. First we use the continuous time con-
tracting techniques as developed by DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006) and Sannikov (2008). They
are particularly appropriate in our context: the decision to speculate can be altered at any point
in time, restructuring naturally corresponds to a stopping time and a large loss can arise at any
7A SIFMU is no subject to bankruptcy law and so cannot be liquidated; instead it is to be placed under receivership
under the administration of the FDIC.
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moment with minute probabilities. The model can be viewed as an extension of DeMarzo and San-
nikov (2006) to speculative activities, as in DeMarzo, Livdan and Tschistyi (2013). To guarantee
existence of an optimal contract, these papers assume that the shareholder (agent) is less patient
that the regulator (principal). Instead we use the exogenous shock with probability . We depart
from DeMarzo et al (2013) in other ways: (i) a contract cannot be conditioned on an exogenous
observable event (a crisis), so \relative performance" evaluation is not possible; and (ii) we do not
rely on public randomization schemes. Rather we let the agent be terminated below a threshold
that may be strictly positive. Second we connect also to banking regulation, and specically the
regulation of equity capital. Our optimal contract is implemented with a minimal equity require-
ment imposed on the rm, the purpose of which is to ensure the shareholder has enough at stake
not to engage in excessive risk-taking. VanHoose (2007) provides a survey that suggests a per-
sistent lack of consensus as to the role and benet of capital requirements. Furlong and Keeley
(1989) establish that asset risk decreases when the capitalization of a bank increases. Milne (2002)
observes that a bank's portfolio choice depends on its capitalization. Our model accords well with
both, and minimum capital requirements induce the institution to choose the less risky path. The
reason is that breaching the capital requirement triggers restructuring and expropriation. Mor-
rison and White (2005) propose a model of adverse selection and moral hazard in which capital
requirements are also used to solve the moral hazard problem and to screen out bad banks (or
bankers). Third, the paper is related to the literature on nancial structure and risk taking, as in
Biais and Casamatta (1999). They model an agency problem with two actions, like ours, however
(i) it is static and (ii) the goal is to determine the optimal nancial structure of the rm; there
are no externalities. As in our paper, equity is necessary to overcome the risk-taking (risk-shifting)
problem. The capital structure of the rm is determined in equilibrium by its nanciers. Last,
we connect to a more recent literature on interventions and bailouts. Zentes (2014) shows the
nature of the rescue matters: if the institution is burdened by excessively large repayments ex
post (as a debtor, for example) it has incentives to default. In our model there is no default but
early intervention that is nal. Mariathasan, Merrouche and Werger (2014) show empirically that
the provision of implicit guarantee enhances risk-taking. Our resolution mechanism is explicit and
expropriates preemptively rather than oering guarantees.
Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 characterizes incentive compatible regulation contracts
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and suggests an intuitive implementation. Section 4 studies the social cost function in details. We
present a discussion in Section 5 and then conclude. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 Model
Consider an infrastructure providing a public service that must be continued in all circumstances.
The government auctions o the right to operate that infrastructure among a pool of potential
investors/managers who have limited wealth !.8Operating cash ows follow the process
dxt = dt+ dZt (2.1)
where  > 0; Z  fZt;Ft; 0 < t <1g is a standard Brownian motion associated with a ltration
Ft on a probability space (
;F ;P). At any point in time the infrastructure is operated by a
particular investor/manager: the shareholder. There are also passive investors who can participate
in the nancing of the infrastructure. All agents are risk-neutral and discount future payments at
rate r > 0.
A regulation contract  species the ow of payment (dividends) dLt to the shareholder, as
well as the termination rule represented by a stopping time  . At date  the rm is restructured at
cost : the incumbent shareholder receives a payment w and the rm is sold to a new shareholder.
Since the environment is stationary the terms of the new regulation contract  = (L; ; w ) remain
the same. The objective of the government is to minimize the expected present value of the public
funds that need to be expended in order to guarantee the continuity of the service provided by the
infrastructure.
There are two sources of frictions. First, in the spirit of DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006) the
operating cash ow at any moment t can be diverted by the shareholder: a dollar diverted brings
  1 dollars to the shareholder. Second, the shareholder can secretely engage in excessively risky
(\speculative") activities that generate an additional cash-ow  per unit of time but expose the
rm to catastrophic losses K that wipe it out.9 For example, the rm sells (but does not buy)
8Either their wealth is exogenously limited to ! or there are competitive markets for investment and ! is the
fraction they devote this opportunity.
9These may be nancial losses as experienced during the GFC or social losses associated with business interruption
for a more traditional utility. Then the regulatory contract forces the shareholder to internalize these externalities.
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CDS or issues options. Or an electricity network may save  on its maintenance, and thereby
expose itself to network failure. Such a catastrophe is governed by a Poisson process of intensity
.10 To simplify the exposition we let the shareholder be subject to an exogenous shock (e.g.
liquidity shock or investment opportunity) governed by an independent Poisson process of intensity
. Whenever hit by this shock the shareholder must divest; the associated stopping time is L.
Beyond the simplication this also maps well into the fact that investors in public infrastructure do
not hold their assets forever, and that these divestments occur randomly. Thus restructuring may be
triggered either for exogenous reasons or for insucient performance. The latter is the contractual
restructuring associated with the stopping time R. Hence the stopping time  = L ^ R: it is the
minimum of either stopping time.
A regulation contract contract is incentive compatible if it is designed in such a way that the
shareholder never nds it optimal to divert cash, nor to engage in speculative activities.
3 The Optimal Contract
Following the recursive approach of Spear and Srivastava (1987) we can characterize any contract
by the stochastic process w describing the continuation payo of the agent when the contract  is
executed. The agent's continuation utility at date t takes the form
wt() = Et
Z 
t
e r(s t)dLs+ e r( t)w
Ft : (3.1)
Using the martingale representation theorem as in Sannikov (2008) the dynamics of w write
dwt = rwtdt+
t

(dxt   E[dxt])  Pt (dNt   E[dNt])  dLt; (3.2)
where t= represents the sensitivity of the agent's continuation payos to cash ows, and Pt
is the penalty incurred in case of a large loss. The power of Sannikov's approach (2008) is that
incentive compatible contracts can be directly characterized by simple conditions on these sensitivity
parameters t and Pt. We now proceed to completely describe these conditions.
10In full generality (see the appendix) the stochastic process (2.1) writes
dxt = (a)dt+ dZt  K[dNt   (a)dt]; with a 2 f0; 1g and (0) = ; (1) = +; (0) = 0; (1) = 
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3.1 Incentive compatibility
Recall that the process L of payments to the shareholder satises the limited liability constraint
dLt  0. From the denition of wt this implies
wt  0:
Proposition 1 No cash is diverted if and only if
t     (3.3)
and there is no speculation if and only if
Pt  t



(3.4)
Combining these two conditions gives the necessary
Pt  

 wm
To deter the agent from diverting funds to her own use the principal species a share t= that she
can keep. Then she prefers (at least weakly) receiving tdZt from the principal to appropriating
the usable fraction  of dZt. Similarly, engaging in speculation generates an additional  but
may trigger a suciently large penalty: Pt  . The incentives are maximized when Pt  wt:
the shareholder must be wiped out after a catastrophe. Any further penalty would violate limited
liability, thus wt  wm so as to preserve incentive compatibility. The rm must be restructured or
recapitalized when wt reaches wm.
3.2 Characterization of the optimal contract
Our rst Proposition outlines the set of incentive compatible contracts. Now we turn to the best
contract among all incentive compatible contracts.
Proposition 2 The optimal contract is such that
 t   (minimum cash ow sensitivity that prevents cash diversion;
 Pt  wt (the shareholder is wiped out in case of a catastrophe;11
11Since catastrophes do not occur along the equilibrium path in this model, any Pt  wm is also optimal.
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  = L ^ R, where R = infftjwt  wmg (termination occurs at the earliest of the exogenous
retirement and the regulatory intervention threshold for insucient performance.)
 Lt  0 (compensation is deferred to date  .
These conditions are easy to interpret. Since regulator and shareholders have the same discount
factor it never helps to disburse any cash in the form of early (that is, before termination) payments
dLt. This is an extreme form of back-loading payments, in order to provide maximum incentives at
minimum cost. Moreover it is strictly better to increase the agent's continuation value: it facilitates
incentive compatibility. In addition, it is optimal for the regulator to allow for the smallest fraction
t of the volatile component of the cash ow dxt   E[dxt] = dZt to be left to the shareholder.
Last, the limited liability constraint on wt implies that Pt  wt; thus imposing a higher penalty
may only trigger earlier restructuring without altering the shareholder's incentives. Hence, along
the optimal path, wt is subject to the dynamics
dwt = rwtdt+ dZt:
Remark 1 The need to not divert cash has a perverse eect: absent the need to deter cash diver-
sion, a at (state-independent) compensation is sucient and clearly also deters speculation. But
speculation may be attractive when the rm (or its owners) pockets a fraction of the earning, which
is prescribed by Condition (3.3).
3.3 Implementation of the optimal contract
In line with Biais , Mariotti, Plantin and Rochet (2007, hereafter BMPR) we propose implementing
the optimal contract using a well-selected nancing and cash management policy.12 The fundamen-
tal principle underlying this implementation is that the rm is required to maintain cash reserves
mt  wt

that stay proportional to the continuation payo wt. At date 0 the winning bidder (who becomes
the shareholder) invests !. The rm issues riskless debt (to the passive investors) paying a constant
12The implementation is not unique. DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006) suggest an implementation using credit lines
instead.
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coupon , which is guaranteed by the government. The government initially injects
m0   ! + I   
r
 0;
where I  0 is the once-and-for-all investment necessary to start the infrastructure. The remaining
(1   )v0 is issued either to outside equity holders or held by public authorities { not doing so
amounts to giving away too much to the shareholder.13 A typical balance sheet is shown below.
Productive Assets Debt
A D
Cash reserves Equity
mt vt
Under the optimal contract there is no speculation so the cash reserves of the rm follow the
dynamics
dmt = rmtdt| {z }
interest
+dt+ dZt| {z }
earnings
  dt|{z}
coupon
therefore the process
dmt =
dwt

= rmtdt+ dZt (3.5)
is also a martingale for any value of . When  = 1 the wealth of the shareholder invested in the
rm is exactly its cash reserves and their evolutions also exactly coincide.
Restructuring takes place at time  = L ^ R, where R is the rst time the cash reserves fall
below = { recall mt = wt=. The government removes the management and expropriates
the shareholder of the utility. Nonetheless there is no breach of contract: these actions are part
of the contract and the shareholder is paid w . The net injection of public funds at that time is
thus contingent on w . However the social cost is independent of these transfers, even if  < 1; it
is simply  > 0.
The total value vt of the equity of the rm, including the shares accruing to the government, is
just equal to mt. The private shareholder holds a fraction  of the equity
wt = vt
13This would be sleeping participation: the government is not actively engaged in the management of the rm {
except when the regulator restructures it.
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while the government's participation is (1  )vt. Hence the stopping time can also be regarded as
the rst time the value of the rm's equity falls below vm  =. This is a capital adequacy
rule. Here it is particularly simple in that the value of the equity is exactly the value of the cash
reserves, which can be observed and is not subject to conicting valuations.
Remark 2 The optimal contract uses a combination of debt and equity to mitigate the two frictions.
Debt solves the cash diversion problem by appropriating expected earnings dt. Equity is used to
prevent speculation: the minimum capital requirement ensures that the shareholder has enough \skin
in the game" to not engage in excessively risky activities.
Remark 3 Our result is also related to the eciency wage model of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984).
They study rms-workers relationships when workers can \shirk" but can be detected with some
exogenous probability, in which case they are red. The eciency wage is the minimum wage that
deters workers from shirking. In our model, the analogue of the eciency wage is the minimum
market value of equity below which the rm starts engaging in excessive risk taking. Then its
shareholders are \red".
From now on we use the equity value vt ( mt) as state variable instead of wt ( vt). This variable
determines the expected cost of public intervention through the cost function C(v) that we now
study in details.
4 The social cost of public intervention
Here we analyze in details the determinants of the social cost of restructuring the rm, for which
we need to characterize the social cost function. The cost of public intervention is related to the
optimal regulation contract through the recursive formulation
C(v) = [ + C(v0)]E

e r jv ; (4.1)
where  = L ^ R; L is exogenous, independent of Z and follows a Poisson process with intensity
 and R is the rst time the equity of the rm falls below the threshold vm:
R = inf ftjvt  vmg :
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Finally the value vt of the rm follows a discounted martingale:
dvt = rvtdt+ dZt: (4.2)
Transfers between the government and shareholders (incumbent and new) do not appear in the
social cost formula (4.1). Since the utility is never discontinued, expected future cash ow amount
to a constant =r that can be ignored (this is paid out to debt holders). Therefore social costs
at any point in time t are simply the expected present value of future restructuring costs. The
recursive formulation expresses it as the sum of the expected present values of the cost of the
next restructuring e r and the continuation cost C(v0)e r . The regulator is constrained by the
limited wealth ! = v0 of new investors.
4.1 Characterization of the social cost function
We begin by outlining a complete characterization of the function C(v) under the optimal contract.
Lemma 1 The function C(v) is the unique solution of the dierential equation
(r + )C(v) = rvC 0(v) +
2
2
C 00(v) + [C(v0) + ]; v  vm (4.3)
with boundary conditions
C(vm) = C(v0) +  (4.4)
and
lim
v!1C(v) =

r + 
[C(v0) + ] (4.5)
The rst boundary condition is the optimal termination condition. When vt < vm speculation can
no longer be prevented (by Condition (3.4)). In light of Remark 1, just oering a at compensation
is an invitation to divert cash. Therefore the rm must be restructured. The shareholder is
expropriated when vt = vm; the regulator incurs a cost  and resets the rm's continuation at v0.
The second condition comes from the fact that
C(v)  E e rL (C(v0) + ) ;
that is, the social cost is at least the cost of occasional (exogenously given) restructures when
shareholders divest because of their exogenous shock. Compulsory restructuring may arise before
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L. Because
E

e rL (C(v0) + )
  
r + 
[C(v0) + ] ;
Condition (4.5) follows.
These boundary conditions are not standard: the function C(v) appears on both sides of (4.4)
and (4.5). It is nonetheless quite easy to show there exists a unique solution the solution C(v).
Proposition 3 Let A(v) be the unique solution to the homogenous equation
(r + )A(v) = rvA0(v) +
2
2
A00(v)
such that A(0) = 1 and A(1) = 0. Then, the function
C(v) =

A(vm) A(v0)


r
A(vm) +A(v)

(4.6)
is the unique solution of the dierential equation (4.3) with boundary conditions (4.4) and (4.5).
It is decreasing and convex on [vm;1).
The function A() can be expressed as a linear combination of conuent hypergeometric functions
of the rst kind M(a; b; z):14
A(v) =M

 1
2

1 +

r

;
1
2
; rv
2
2

  2v
p
r

 
 
3
2 +

2r

 
 
1 + 2r
M   
2r
;
3
2
; rv
2
2

;
where  () denotes the Gamma function. Function C(v) is depicted in Figure 1.
The convexity of C(v) is the reason why it is indeed optimal to set the sensitivity t of the
shareholder's continuation value wt to its minimum value: t  . In addition, any early payment
to the agent (dLt) would decrease vt and therefore the survival probability of the rm. Similarly
any increase in the penalty Pt beyond wm increases the probability of restructure; more precisely
it triggers a restructure before it is actually necessary.
4.2 Properties of the social cost function
The quasi explicit characterization of the social cost function allows to derive easily several com-
parative statics results:
14See Abramowitz and Stegun (1964)
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vm v
C(v)
v0m

r+ ( + C(v0))
C(vm) =  + C(v0)
C(v0m) =  + C(v0)
The social cost function C(v) parametrized by vm or v
0
m.
Proposition 4 The social cost of public intervention
1. increases with the minimum capital requirement vm = =;
2. decreases with the wealth ! = v0 of potential shareholders;
3. increases with the eciency  of the cash diversion technology;
4. is proportional to the restructuring cost ;
5. increases with the intensity  of the exogenous shocks to shareholders.
Some of these comparative statics deserve commentary. When investors are eectively less able to
commit ( increases) the frequency of restructuring can only increase. Indeed we can see from the
boundary condition (4.5) that the lower bound on the social cost C(v) increases. It is mathemati-
cally easy to see that the social cost decreases with !. The intuition is equally simple: if the initial
equity injection v0 of the shareholder were unbounded the rm would never reach the termination
threshold vm { which is independent of v0.
That C(v) increases with vm and  may not be so immediate, for we learned to expect that
better-capitalized rms are more resilient. These comparative statics are connected, and their
impact relates to Proposition 2. Increasing vm (say, above =) increases the frequency of
costly restructures. But it does not change the shareholder's incentives to (not) engage in risky
activities. So this too validates the earlier claim that wm  =. The eect of  is a little more
14
subtle: for any wt;  decreases vt (starting at v0). So it is as if the shareholder were committing
less of her wealth to the operation of the rm at any point in time. Then the penalty Pt = wm has
less bite.
5 Discussion
The optimal regulation contract can be implemented using an appropriate combination of debt and
equity with an appropriate termination rule. As in other papers, debt has a disciplining eect: it
is used to extract the rm's free cash ow, which prevents cash diversion. But it is not sucient
and leaves open the problem of speculation, so equity is necessary too here. It takes the form of
a minimal equity requirements, which guarantees that the shareholder keeps enough at stake to
not engage in excessive risk-taking. It unwinds the limited liability of the shareholder. This equity
requirement is complemented with restructuring (which includes expropriation and compensation
at market value of the shareholder) that is triggered every time the capital requirement is violated.
Thus the equity requirement has a quite a dierent role than the \buer against losses" often
advocated in the banking regulation literature. Instead of absorbing losses and reducing the cost
(and frequency) of public intervention, a higher capital requirement increases them! The reason
is that a higher requirement vm corresponds to a higher expected return on speculative activities
=. Then restructuring is bound to occur more frequently for any bounded wealth ! (to
prevent speculation). It would be cheaper in the short run for the regulator to ignore the breach
of capital requirement (and possibly only restructure upon insolvency). But this violates incentive
compatibility and therefore is socially too costly. So the capital requirement can also be seen as
necessary to prompt early corrective action. This action must be drastic here, since social losses
can be very large.
Our resolution mechanism is termination and on sale to a new shareholder. It very much
diers from a bailout: termination occurs not because of nancial distress but to preserve incentive
compatibility. Yet it guarantees continuation of service, as is socially desirable for SIFMUs and
many other utilities. This diers from the proposals of Tucker, who advocates orderly wind-down
of nancial utilities in distress. If these nancial utilities are indeed essential, orderly wind-down
is not credible and that regulation is toothless.
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We show that the cash diversion parameter  inuences the social cost of public intervention
(Proposition 4). This is not obvious, for cash ow and speculation are independent actions in the
model. To best see the connection, notice that the eciency  of cash ow diversion enters the
restructuring threshold wm = (=) (here expressed in terms of the agent's wealth). The
reason is that if she speculates, the agent appropriates ; so the higher , the more protable is
speculation and the harder it is to deter it. This exactly translates into a higher capital requirement
that we know to increase social costs. Remark 1 tells us that the incentives to speculate are
generated by the solution of the cash ow diversion problem. We now also know (i) how costly this
is, thanks to the function C(v), (ii) that cost increases with the severity of the cash ow diversion
problem and (iii) what it implies in terms of capital requirements.
Monitoring is a standard remedy to moral hazard. Here one has to be careful as to what is
monitored. Monitoring that somehow results in reducing the change  in the drift is uniformly
positive: it reduces the threshold vm by curtailing the incentives to engage in risky activities. In
contrast, monitoring to reduce the incidence of catastrophes  is uniformly bad(!). It increases
vm in that it is a license to speculate: a large loss is even less likely. An immediate implication of
this model in terms of risk management is that, to the extent it is possible, it is better to reduce
the magnitude of losses (K) than their frequency .
6 Conclusion
We have characterized the optimal regulation contract for a \risky utility" in a dynamic model of
risk-taking under moral hazard. The model is relevant for a broad range of applications, ranging
from standard utilities to the newly designated nancial utilities. The emphasis is laid on the
survival risk of these businesses, and on the externalities their failure (either nancial or operational)
generates.
Regulation is needed to alleviate two frictions. Shareholders can divert some of the earnings to
their benet. They can also engage in excessively risky activities to increase those earnings in the
short run at the expense of catastrophic losses (in the longer term).
The optimal contract can be implemented by an appropriate mix of debt and equity, and a
stringent termination rule. The equity requirement plays a very dierent role than in standard
16
model of banking regulation, for example. It is not there to absorb losses but instead to discipline
the rm and to trigger \prompt corrective action" from the regulator. Preventing regulatory
forbearance is thus of primary importance for risky utilities.
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Appendix
A Technical background
In the main text we set aside some technicalities. Underlying the choice of whether to speculate is
an action: a 2 f0; 1g that alters the drift (a)dt and introduces the Poisson process dNt of losses K.
That action generates a probability distribution over the paths of both (a) and N ; so (implicitly)
all expectations are taken with respect to that distribution. Correspondingly, a contract involves a
FNt -adapted cumulative payment Lt to the shareholder and a FNt -stopping time R.
To write Proposition 1 we need the dynamics of the agent's continuation value wt. When she
has a history of reports ~x = x up to time t and does not speculate at t, her value reads
	t =
Z t
0
e rsdLs(x) + e rtwt(x)
and is clearly a martingale. Hence there exists a process t(x) such that d	t = e
 rt t(x)
 [dxt   dt].
Dierentiate the rst expression and re-arrange these two expressions to obtain dwt = rwt  dLt+
tdZt. If instead the agent speculates and is subject to the penalty Pt,
b	t = Z t
0
e rsdLs(x) + 
Z t
0
e rsds+ e rtwt(x) 
Z t
0
PsdNs
and is also a martingale with respect to the ltration FNt given the action a = 1. The auxiliary
process becomes
db	t = e rtt(x)

[dxt   (+)dt] = e rtt(x)dZt
Dierentiate b	t:
db	t = e rtdLt(x) + e rt  re rtwt(x)dt+ e rtdwt(x)  PtdNt;
so when she speculates the agent's continuation utility follows the dynamics
d bwt = rwt + dt  dLt + tdZt   PtdNt
B Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: Condition (3.3) mirrors DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006) and follows from
the derivations above. Note that because d	t = db	t, the sensitivity t is the same regardless of
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whether the agent speculates. To deter the her from engaging in (excessively) speculative activities,
one needs the penalty to be large enough so that
dwt  d bwt
that is
Pt  

Combining with (3.3) binding one has Pt    wm, which is feasible only when wt  wm by
limited liability.
Proof of Proposition 2: Setting Pt > wm is neutral on the rm's incentives whether to
engage in speculation. However recall the recursive formulation of C(v) and that
 = L ^ R = L ^ infftjwt = Ptg
for any Pt, and where the equality owes to the limited liability constraint Pt  wt. Clearly R is
decreasing in Pt so that  is at least weakly decreasing. Therefore
C(v) = [ + C(v0)]E

e r jv
is increasing in Pt. The lowest penalty Pt that is compatible with incentive compatibility is vm.
Because regulator and shareholder discount the future at the same rate r, there is no cost in
substituting payments for an increase in the continuation value wt. There is a strict benet to
doing so since R = infftjwt = Ptg. From the dynamics of the continuation value under an
incentive compatible contract
dwt = rwt   dLt + tdZt; wt  wm
one sees that decreasing dLt correspondingly shifts the trajectory of wt. So it is in the regulator's
interest to set dLt  0. Then under an incentive compatible contract the agent's utility is
dwt = rwt + tdZt; wt  wm:
Given this, the regulator's value function must satisfy the HJB equation of the form
(r + )C(w) = min
t;
rwC 0(w) +
2t
2
C 00(w) + constant; wt  wm; (B.1)
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the maximum of which yields the dierential equation (4.3) with the appropriate change of variable.
Anticipating Proposition 3, C 0 < 0 and C 00 > 0 so it is easy to se that (B.1) is a sub-martingale
except when t = .
Proof of Lemma 1: From (4.3)-(4.5), the function C takes the form
(r + )C(v) =  [ + C(v0)] + c0H0(v) + c1H1(v)
where (H0;H1) are basis of solutions for the homogenous equation
(r + )H(v) = rvH 0(v) +
2
2
H 00(v)
with
H0(0) = 1 = H
0
1(0)
H1(0) = 0 = H
0
0(0):
By the Cauchy-Lipschitz theorem the functions H0 and H1 are uniquely dened. The parameters
c0; c1 are derived from the boundary conditions. From (4.4), limv!1C(v) = [C(v0) + ]=(r + )
implies
lim
v!1

H0(v) +
c1
c0
H1(v)

= 0 (B.2)
directly from the denition of C(v). So one has
c1
c0
=   lim
v!1
H1
H0
;
and where H0;H1 are uniquely dened. Condition (4.5) gives:

r + 
[ + C(v0)] + c0

H0(vm) +
c1
c0
H1(vm)

=  +

r + 
[ + C(v0)] + c0

H0(v0) +
c1
c0
H1(v0)

;
which simplies for c0 in terms of the functions H0; H1 only. So the constants c1; c0 are uniquely
identied.
Proof of Proposition 3: We rst explicit how to compute the parameters c0; c1. Let c  c1c0 ;
with this, rewrite (B.2)
C(v) =

r + 
[ + C(v0)] + c0 [H0(v) + cH1(v)] (B.3)
=

r + 
[ + C(v0)] + c0A(v)
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with c0; C(v0) are just numbers to be determined. The termination condition (4.4) then becomes

r + 
[ + C(v0)] + c0A(vm) =  +

r + 
[ + C(v0)] + c0A(v0)
so the condition for c0 is
c0  
A(vm) A(v0) : (B.4)
We need to sign c0, for which we need to understand the behaviour of A(v), and therefore the sign
of the constant c buried in the denition (B.3) of C(v). For this we are left identifying the functions
H0;H1, which will determine c and c0 given the exogenous values vm and v0.
The conuent hypergeometric function of the rst kind M(a; b; z) is the unique solution the
conuent hypergeometric dierential equation (also called Kummer's equation)
aM(z) = (b  z)M 0(z) + zM 00(z); M(0) = 1; M 0(0) = a
b
(B.5)
In the next two Lemmata we construct the basis functions H0 and H1 and show each solves
Kummer's equation. With this one can then compute c.
Lemma 2 H0(v) =M

 12
 
1 + r

; 12 ;  rv
2
2

Proof: Dierentiate:
H 00(v) =  
2rv
2
M 0
H 000 (v) =  
2r
2
M 0 +
4r2v2
4
M 00
So
rvH 00 +
2
2
H 000 =  

2r2v2
2
+ r

M 0 +
2r2v2
2
M 00 (B.6)
and (B.5) becomes
 

1
2
+

2r

M =  rv
2
2
M 00 +

1
2
+
rv2
2

M 0;
where a =  (1=2 + =2r) and b = 1=2. Hence by (B.6),
rvH 00 +
2
2
H 000| {z }
=(r+)H0
=  2r

rv2
2
+
1
2

M 0   rv
2
2
M 00

| {z }
= 2raM0
The proof is complete once we have noted that H0(0) =M(0) = 1 and H
0
0(0) = 0.
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Lemma 3 H1(v) = v M

  2r ; 32 ;  rv
2
2

Proof: As in the proof of Lemma 2, dierentiate
H 01 = M  
2rv2
2
M 0
H 001 =  
6rv
2
M 0 +
4rv3
4
M 00
So that the RHS of the elementary dierential equation writes
rvH 00 +
2
2
H 000 =  

3rv +
2r2v3
2

M 0 +
2r2v3
2
M 00 + rvM1 (B.7)
and (B.5) reads
  
2r
M =  rv
2
2
M 00 +

3
2
+
rv2
2

M 0;
where a =  =2r and b = 3=2. Therefore by (B.7),
rvH 01 +
2
2
H 001| {z }
=(r+)H1
=  2rv

rv2
2
+
3
2

M 0   rv
2
2
M 00   M
2

| {z }
= 2rvaM1
and we note that H1(0) = 0;H
0
1(0) =M(0) = 1.
The functions H0;H1 give us a determination for c =   limv!1 H0(v)H1(v) . Indeed, any conuent
hypergeometric function M(a; b; z) can be expressed as
M(a; b; z) =
 (b)
 (b  a)( z)
 a 1 +O(jzj 1) ; z 2 R  
where  () is the Gamma function (see Abramovitz and Stegun (1964), Chapter 13, Theorems
13.1.4 and 13.1.5). Forming the ratio of H0 and H1 and simplifying yields
c =   (1=2)
 (3=2)
 (3=2 + =2r)
 (1 + =2r)
p
r

and since  (1=2) =
p
 and  (3=2) = (1=2)
p
,
c =  2
p
r

 (3=2 + =2r)
 (1 + =2r)
< 0:
With this we can establish, rst
Lemma 4 The function A(v) is the unique solution to the homogenous equation
(r + )A(v) = rvA0(v) +
2
2
A00(v) (B.8)
with boundary condition A(0) = 1 and limv!1A(v) = 0.
22
Proof: That A(v) solves (B.8) follows directly from its denition: A(v) = H0(v) + cH1(v).
Then immediately A(0) = 1 and A(1) = 0 by (4.5).
Second
Lemma 5 The function A : R+ 7! R is decreasing convex.
Proof: Since A0(v) = H 00(v)+ cH 01(v); A0(0) = 0+ c < 0, so A(v) is indeed decreasing in v from
0. Furthermore, by (B.8), at v = 0
(r + ) = 0 +
2
2
A00(0) > 0
Suppose now that A(v) is not monotone. We rule out all cases in turns. First a local maximum
with A(v1) > 0 is impossible for then we must have A(v1) > 0; A
0(v1) = 0 and A00(v1) < 0, which
contradicts (B.8). Second, a local minimum v2 with A(v2) > 0 is also impossible: at v2; A
00(v2) > 0
and so there must be a local maximiser v3 with A(v3) > 0; we just ruled that out. Third, there
cannot be an inexion point with A(v1) > 0 for then A
00(v1) = 0, which is again impossible
by (B.8). Fourth, it cannot reach a local minimum v3 where A(v3) < 0, for then we must have
A(v3) < 0; A
0(v1) = 0 and A00(v3) > 0. Again this is impossible by (B.8). Fifth, an inexion point
below 0 is impossible for then A00(v1) = 0. Last, a local maximum with A(v4) < 0 can also be ruled
out: if so, there must be a local minimum with A(v5) < 0, which was just shown to be impossible.
With (B.4) the social cost function reads
C(v) =

r + 
[ + C(v0)] +

A(vm) A(v0)A(v):
where A(v) is decreasing convex and C(v0) is a number. Therefore
c0 =

A(vm) A(v0) > 0
since v0 > vm, and it follows that C(v) is also decreasing convex. Finally together both this
denition and the boundary condition (4.4) tell us that
 + C(v0) =
r + 
r

A(vm) A(v0)A(vm)
substituting in the denition of C(v) then yields
C(v) =

A(vm) A(v0)


r
A(vm) +A(v)

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as claimed.
Proof of Proposition 4: Items 4 and 5 are obvious from the denition of C(v). To show
item 1, rewrite the function C(v) as
C(v) =

r

A(vm) + rA(v)
A(vm) A(v0)

=

r

 +
A(v0) + rA(v)
A(vm) A(v0)

which is clearly increasing in vm since A(vm) is decreasing. Bearing this in mind, item 2 follows
from the original denition of C(v). Last, substitute vt = wt= in C(v) and dierentiate the above
expression. It is sucient to consider the numerator
 

A0

!


! +A0

w


w

 2

A

wm


 A

!


+

A0

wm


wm  A0

!


!

 2

A

!


+A

w


> 0
since wm  ! and A() is a decreasing function.
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